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THE RIGHT TO MARRY
Cass R. Sunstein*

ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court has said that there is a constitutional "right to marry";
but what can this possibly mean? People do not have a right to marry their
dog, their aunt, June 29, a rose petal, or a sunny day. This essay attempts to
make some progress in understanding both the content and the scope of the
right to marry. With respect to content, it concludes that people have no more
and no less than this: a right of access to whatever expressive and material
benefits the state now provides for the institution of marriage. It follows that
the right to marry falls within the "fundamental rights" branch of equal
protection doctrine, and is not properly understood in terms of substantive due
process; it also follows that the state could abolish the official institution of
marriage tomorrow. With respect to scope, the essay identifies a minimal
understanding, to the effect that the right to marry is enjoyed by any couple
consisting of one adult man and one adult woman. The minimal understanding
can claim a plausible defense in a tradition-based understanding of
fundamental rights; and on institutional grounds, a tradition-based
understanding has a great deal of appeal. Its problem is that it has a degree of
arbitrariness. This is a formidable problem, but for reasons of prudence,
federal courts should not adopt a broader understanding that would, for
example, require same-sex marriages to be recognized. The essay concludes
with some remarks on the possible abolition of the official institution of
marriage. It explains that there are plausible grounds for objecting to that
institution. It emphasizes that marriage is emphatically a government-run
licensing system, no more and no less, and that an understanding of this point
should inform constitutional discussion.

* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. This is a substantially revised text of the
Uri & Caroline Bauer Memorial Lecture, delivered at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law on
September 8, 2004; readers are asked to make allowances for a text originally intended for oral
delivery. I am most grateful to the students and faculty of the law school community for their
kindness and multiple suggestions during my visit. I am also grateful to Martha Nussbaum for
many discussions, to Mary Anne Case, Elizabeth Emens, and Carolyn Frantz for helpful
comments, and to Rob Park for excellent research assistance.
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The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.... Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man,
fundamental to our very existence and survival.
-Loving

v. Virginia**

Modern marriagehas lost its meaning-consequently one abolishes
it.
-Friedrich

Nietzsche***

Why should the state privilege some adult dyads but not others? Why
should the state privilege only dyads? Why not triads? In other
words, what business does the state have in deciding which adult
personal relationships are deserving of legalprotection and benefits
and which are not?

-Patricia

Cain****

INTRODUCTION

Is there a constitutional right to marry? On several occasions, the
Supreme Court has said so.' But the very idea of a "right to marry"
presents two sets of puzzles. The first involves the content of the
right-what it provides for those who are entitled to it. The second set
of puzzles involves the scope of the right to marry-the kinds of
relationships that can claim it.
Begin with the first puzzle. As an official matter, marriage is no
more and no less than a government-run licensing system. Why should
governments license marriages? Some people are skeptical of the
official institution of marriage and argue that it should be abolishednot by forbidding private arrangements, religious or otherwise, but by
eliminating the special status that governments confer, including a
unique set of legal benefits and burdens. 2 Doubts about this particular
licensing system cast in sharp relief the wide range of possibilities, with
respect to human relationships, that the simple notions of "married" and

**
** *

388 U.S. 1(1967).
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 544 (Walter

Kaufmann trans. & ed., 1954).
* * * * Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27 (1996)
I See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
2 See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004);
Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage,16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 27 (1996); Jennifer Jaff,
Wedding Bell Blues, 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 207 (1988).
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"single" tend to erase. 3 But are states under a constitutional obligation
to recognize an official institution called "marriage?" Does the Due
Process Clause really mean that governments must provide tax, social
security, and other benefits to those who are lawfully married? Or does
it mean, much more modestly, that states may not forbid religious and
other organizations from performing "marriage ceremonies" and
allowing those who go through such ceremonies to claim that status as a
matter of personal choice?
And what relationships are included within the right to marry?
People do not have a right to marry their dog, their house, their
refrigerator, July 21, or a rose petal. At most, people have a right to
marry people. But the Supreme Court cannot possibly have meant to
suggest that "people" have a general right to marry "people"; it did not
mean to say that under the Due Process Clause, any "person" has a right
to marry a dozen other people, or five, or even two. We might conclude
that the Court is saying at most that one person has a right to marry one
other person. But if a right to marry exists, what is the basis for this
particular limitation on the right?
The major goal of this essay is to make some progress in
understanding the content and scope of the right to marry. My initial
suggestion is that the right to marry is best understood as an analogue to
the right to vote. In both cases, states are under no obligation to create
the relevant institutions; but once the state creates those institutions, the
Constitution imposes large barriers to government efforts to deny
people access to them. This point suggests that the right to marry
should be taken as part of the "fundamental rights" branch of equal
protection, not as part of substantive due process. But what is the
institution of marriage? It has two characteristics: the expressive
legitimacy that comes from the public institution of marriage; and the
panoply of material benefits, both economic and non-economic, that the
marital relationship confers. 4 The right to marry, then, comprises a
3 Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129 (2003);
Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004).
4 For a highly illuminating summary of one state's law, see Goodridge v. Dep 't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-56 (Mass. 2003) (citations omitted):
With no attempt to be comprehensive, we note that some of the statutory benefits
conferred by the Legislature on those who enter into civil marriage include, as to
property: joint Massachusetts income tax filing; tenancy by the entirety (a form of
ownership that provides certain protections against creditors and allows for the
automatic descent of property to the surviving spouse without probate); extension of
the benefit of the homestead protection (securing up to $300,000 in equity from
creditors) to one's spouse and children; automatic rights to inherit the property of a
deceased spouse who does not leave a will; the rights of elective share and of dower
(which allow surviving spouses certain property rights where the decedent spouse has
not made adequate provision for the survivor in a will); entitlement to wages owed to a
deceased employee; eligibility to continue certain businesses of a deceased spouse; the
HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 2083 2004-2005
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right of access to the expressive and material benefits that the state
affords to the institution of marriage. Unless a compelling justification
can be found, no one can be denied access to those benefits. This
understanding of the right to marry suggests that states may abolish
marriage without offending the Constitution; it also suggests that so
long as the institution of marriage exists, the relevant right entitles
people, not to any particular set of expressive and material benefits, but
to exactly that panoply of benefits that the relevant state offers. In this
respect, the dimensions of the right are determined by close reference to
positive law.
But what is the scope of that right? At a minimum, the right
includes relationships between one man and one woman. Hence we can
specify the minimal content of the right to marry: a right, by one adult
man and one adult woman, to enter into the marital relationship, with
whatever expressive and material incidents the state affords, unless the
relevant restriction is supported by compelling justifications. This
minimal understanding is fully consistent with the Supreme Court's
decisions. It can also claim plausible support in a tradition-centered
approach to constitutional interpretation, one that attempts to root an

right to share the medical policy of one's spouse; thirty-nine week continuation of
health coverage for the spouse of a person who is laid off or dies; preferential options
under the Commonwealth's pension system; preferential benefits in the
Commonwealth's medical program, MassHealth; financial protections for spouses of
certain Commonwealth employees (fire fighters, police officers, prosecutors, among
others) killed in the performance of duty; the equitable division of marital property on
divorce; temporary and permanent alimony rights; the right to separate support on
separation of the parties that does not result in divorce; and the right to bring claims for
wrongful death and loss of consortium, and for funeral and burial expenses and
punitive damages resulting from tort actions.
Exclusive marital benefits that are not directly tied to property rights include the
presumptions of legitimacy and parentage of children born to a married couple; and
evidentiary rights, such as the prohibition against spouses testifying against one
another about their private conversations, applicable in both civil and criminal cases.
Other statutory benefits of a personal nature available only to married individuals
include qualification for bereavement or medical leave to care for individuals related
by blood or marriage; an automatic "family member" preference to make medical
decisions for an incompetent or disabled spouse who does not have a contrary health
care proxy; the application of predictable rules of child custody, visitation, support, and
removal out-of-State when married parents divorce.
Where a married couple has children, their children are also directly or indirectly, but
no less auspiciously, the recipients of the special legal and economic protections
obtained by civil marriage. Notwithstanding the Commonwealth's strong public policy
to abolish legal distinctions between marital and nonmarital children in providing for
the support and care of minors, the fact remains that marital children reap a measure of
family stability and economic security based on their parents' legally privileged status
that is largely inaccessible, or not as readily accessible, to nonmarital children. Some of
these benefits are social, such as the enhanced approval that still attends the status of
being a marital child. Others are material, such as the greater ease of access to familybased State and Federal benefits that attend the presumptions of one's parentage.
HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 2084 2004-2005
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understanding of liberty in longstanding practices. 5 Under the minimal
understanding, some bans on incestuous marriages are probably
unconstitutional; but the bans on homosexual, bigamous, and
polygamous marriages are legitimate, simply because such marriages do
not involve one man and one woman.
The principal problem with the minimal understanding is that it
seems to draw arbitrary lines. Why should the scope of the right be
limited in that way? Compare a maximal understanding of the right to
marry: a right, by two or more adults, to enter into the marital
relationship, with its expressive and material incidents, unless the
relevant restriction is supported by compelling justifications. This
approach would essentially convert marriage from a closed licensing
system into an open-ended one, allowing people to enter into marital
agreements as they see fit. Such an approach might tailor its economic
incidents to the particulars of the relationship-refusing, for example, to
accord economic benefits when there is no sufficient reason for them.
From the constitutional point of view, the problem with the maximal
understanding is that it depends on a broad and unanchored
understanding of "liberty," one that endangers restrictions on marriage
that are at least time-honored. The task is to produce a conception of
the scope of the right that lacks the arbitrariness of the minimal
understanding and also the extreme breadth of the maximal one.
I suggest that for courts, the best way to carry out that task is by
reference not to the Due Process Clause, which is founded on tradition,
but the Equal Protection Clause, which calls traditions into sharp doubt.
The question is whether a state has an adequate justification, under the
appropriate standard of review, to deny certain people access to the
The maximal
expressive and material benefits of marriage.
understanding is certainly not compelled by equal protection principles,
but the minimal understanding runs into serious difficulties, above all in
the context of prohibitions on same-sex marriages. I contend that in
principle, bans on same-sex marriage do run into real problems under
the Equal Protection Clause, but that federal courts should be extremely
reluctant to invalidate such bans for prudential reasons involving their
limited role in the constitutional order. The issue of same-sex marriage
is best handled through democratic arenas and at the state level
(plausibly including decisions of state courts).
I conclude with some general remarks about the institution of
marriage. As many people have argued, there are reasons to question
whether states should operate and license the marital institution. It is
not unreasonable to ask whether marriage should be deregulatedwhether it should be run by religious and other institutions, subject not
5 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (plurality opinion).
HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 2085 2004-2005
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to state licensing law, but to rules of contract and criminal prohibitions.
I attempt to spell out the grounds for this view. Because the abolition of
state-licensed marriage would be such a radical step, one that would
defeat longstanding expectations and eliminate one means through
which people affirm their commitments to one another, I do not favor it.
But an appreciation of the arguments in opposition to official marriage
helps to cast the right to marry in a fresh light, by demonstrating that we
are speaking here of a system of aggressive government intervention,
not of anything that stems from nature. For the future, the shape of that
system should be seen as chosen rather than dictated. Constitutional
decisions should be cautious, here as elsewhere, but they should be
made with an awareness that marriage is a government-operated
licensing scheme, no less and no more.

I.

MARRIAGE AND THE SUPREME COURT

The constitutional right to marriage has long origins. In 1888, the
Court described marriage as "the most important relation in life,"' 6 and
said that it was "the foundation of the family and of society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress."'7 In Meyer v.
Nebraska,8 one of the cases that created substantive due process in its
current form, the Court said that the Due Process Clause protected the
right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children." 9 In Skinner v.
Oklahoma,10 striking down a compulsory sterilization law, the Court
described marriage as "fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race."' I Griswold v. Connecticut12 held that states could not ban
married couples from using contraceptives. The Court emphasized that
it was dealing with "a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rightsolder than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage
is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred."' 3
None of these cases, however, involved the right to marry as such.
In its modern form, the right to marry is principally a product of three
cases. The initial decision is Loving v. Virginia,14 where the Court
struck down a ban on interracial marriage. Most of the Court's opinion
6 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
7 Id. at 211.
8 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
9 Id. at 399.
10 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
1l Id. at 541.
12 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13 Id. at 486.
14 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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spoke in terms of the Equal Protection Clause, seeing that ban as a form
of racial discrimination. The Court could easily have stopped there.
But in a separate ruling, set off in a puzzlingly independent section, the
Court also held that the ban violated the Due Process Clause. In the
Court's words, "the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men." 15 It added that "[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights
16 What does
of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."
this mean? Apparently the Court believed that procreation, and possibly
the successful raising of children, are inextricably linked to the
institution of marriage.
But the Loving Court's due process ruling was not free from
ambiguity. After emphasizing that freedom to marry is "one of the vital
personal rights," the Court added that the Due Process Clause is
violated if the government denies "this fundamental freedom on so
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these
statutes"; it stressed that "freedom of choice to marry" may "not be
restricted by invidious racial discrimination." 17 Subsequent cases
confirm that the right to marry counts as fundamental for constitutional
purposes-and is sufficient by itself to take the analysis into the domain
of heightened scrutiny.
The key decision is Zablocki v. Redhail.18 There the Court invoked
the Equal Protection Clause to strike down a Wisconsin law forbidding
people under child support obligations to remarry unless they obtained a
judicial determination that they had met those obligations and that their
The Court
children were not likely to become public charges.
announced that "the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all
individuals,"' 9 and added that "the decision to marry has been placed on
the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. ' 20 The Court did not
give a careful explanation for this conclusion. It noted that women have
a right to seek an abortion or to give birth to an illegitimate child; it
claimed that "a decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional
family setting must receive equivalent protection. 2 1 The Court added
that if the "right to procreate means anything at all, it must imply some
right to enter the only relationship in which" the state "allows sexual
relations legally to take place." 22 The apparent suggestion here is that
Id.at 12.
16 Id.(citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
17 Id. at 12.
18 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
19 Id.at 384.
20 Id.at 386.
21 Id.
15

22 Id.
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the right to marry has constitutional status because the status of
marriage represents a legal precondition for sexual relations. (In a
period in which the Constitution is seen to protect sexual relations
outside of marriage, 23 this suggestion loses its foundation.)
Notwithstanding its clear association of the right to marry with other
rights protected by the Due Process Clause, the Court's ultimate holding
turned on the fundamental rights branch of the equal protection
doctrine, not on substantive due process-a point to which I will return.
The Court did not mean to suggest that because of the existence of
the right to marry, it would apply strict scrutiny to "every state
regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisite
for marriage. '24 The Court said that it would uphold "reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into
the marital relationship. ' 25 But any "direct and substantial" interference
with the right to marry would be strictly scrutinized. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Stevens underlined the point, urging that the
Constitution would cast serious doubt on any "classification which
determines who may lawfully enter into the marriage relationship. '26
This suggestion appears to be extremely broad, applying to incestuous
and same-sex marriages among others-though it is doubtful that
Justice Stevens meant to suggest that states must recognize those
marriages. In Zablocki itself, the restriction could not be justified, for it
was an unnecessarily intrusive means of ensuring compliance with child
support obligations.
In Turner v. Safi, 27 the Court followed and extended Zablocki,
striking down a prison regulation that prohibited inmates from marrying
unless there were "compelling reasons" for them to do so. "Compelling
reasons" were understood to include pregnancy or the birth of an
illegitimate child. 28 The Court acknowledged that the prison setting is
distinctive and usually calls for a measure of judicial deference. But it
concluded that Zablocki applies in that setting, at least in such a way as
to call for invalidation of the prison regulation. In fact the Court went
beyond its previous decisions to spell out some of the foundations of the
right to marry. It said that marriages, by inmates as by others, "are
expressions of emotional support and public commitment. '29 It
emphasized that these are "important and significant aspects of the
marital relationship. ' 30 It added that marriages are often recognized as
23 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
24 434 U.S. at 386.
25 Id.at 386-87 (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977)).
26 Id.at 404.

27 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
28 Id.at 82.
29 Id.at 95.

30 Id.at 96.
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having spiritual significance-and that "marital status often is a
prerequisite for" a number of material benefits, including property
rights, government benefits, and less tangible advantages. 3 1 These
conclusions underlay the Court's conclusion that even in prisons, the
right to marry must be respected unless the state produces compelling
reasons to interfere with such a right.
Very oddly, the Turner Court did not specify whether the right to
marry is rooted in substantive due process (as Loving suggested) or in
the fundamental rights branch of equal protection doctrine (the most
sensible reading of Zablocki). It would be fair to read the Court as
treating marriage as akin to other privacy rights, in a way that suggests
that substantive due process is involved. But for purposes of reaching
its conclusion, the Court did not have to choose between the two
possible sources of its decision.

II.

WHAT IS THE RIGHT TO MARRY? OF POSITIVE RIGHTS AND
NEGATIVE RIGHTS

Suppose that there is a right to marry. What, exactly, does this
mean? Imagine that a state abolishes the institution of marriage in the
following sense: it says that it will not recognize anything called
"marriage," nor will it provide marriage licenses in any form. It will not
legitimate particular relationships through declaring them as
"marriages." Nor will it confer special economic or other benefits on
people who deem themselves to be "married." But it will not forbid
such private arrangements as people choose. Above all, it will allow
private persons to organize their personal relationships as they see fit,
subject to imaginable limitations stemming from the criminal law (as in
the ban on sexual relations with children and on incest). Religious
ceremonies, constituting relationships that the parties may call
"marriage," or whatever they like, would not be abolished. If the parties
follow the proper formalities for enforceable contracts, their agreements
would be enforceable under the ordinary terms of contract law. The
state would provide default rules here as elsewhere. But as a matter of
law, and apart from these points, there would be no such thing as
"marriage" as an official matter of state licensing.
Does the "right to marry" mean that the abolition of marriage
would be unconstitutional? 32 Under the Court's decisions, this would
not be an implausible conclusion. Perhaps the Court is best understood
as recognizing the existence, within Anglo-American law, of the
31 Id.
32 See Cain, supra note 2, for general discussion on whether the abolition of marriage would
be unconstitutional.
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institution of marriage as one that the government recognizes and

safeguards. But if there is a right to an official institution of marriage,
what must the state do or provide? The initial question is what marriage
actually entails. We need to distinguish here between material benefits
on the one hand and expressive ones on the other.

Many material benefits, economic and non-economic, accompany
the marital relationship. 33 Of course state law varies, but these benefits
34
fall into six major categories.
1. Tax benefits (and burdens). While a great deal of attention
is paid to the "marriage penalty," the tax system rewards
many couples when they marry-at least if one spouse
earns a great deal more than the other.3 5 (The marriage
penalty can be significant if the spouses both earn
substantial incomes.) 36 Married couples can file joint
returns. Members of such couples are allowed to transfer
property between one another within being subject to gainloss valuation.
2. Entitlements. Federal law benefits members of married
couples through a number of entitlement programs. Under
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 37 for example,
employers must allow unpaid leave to workers who seek to
care for a spouse; they need not do so for "partners."
Veterans benefits provide a range of economic programs
(involving medical care, housing, and educational
assistance) to the spouses, but not the partners, of
veterans. 38 Those who are married to federal employees
can also claim benefits unavailable to those who are
unmarried. Under state law, the entitlement to consortium

33 See supra note 4; Thomas F. Coleman, The High Cost of Being Single in America, at
http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/cost-discrimination.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
34 I draw here on Bernstein, supra note 3, and David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal
Consequences of Marriageand the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 447 (1996).
35 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Penalty/Bonus Debate: Legislative Issues in
Black and White, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 287, 288-90 (1999) [hereinafter Brown, Debate]
(describing how the marriage bonus is highest in one-income households); Dorothy A. Brown,
Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1469, 1479 (1997) (describing the effects of marriage on a couple's federal tax liabilities);
Robert S.McIntyre & Michael J. McIntyre, Fixing the "MarriagePenalty" Problem, 33 VAL. U.
L. REV. 907 (1999) (same).
36 See Brown, Debate, supra note 35, at 288-90 (giving examples of the marriage penalty for
spouses with similar incomes).
37 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2000).
38 See, e.g., Jonathan Andrew Hein, Caringfor the Evolving American Family: Cohabitating
Partnersand Employer Sponsored Health Care, 30 N.M. L. REV. 19, 21 n.20 (2000) (citing
Dennis Hostetler & Joan E. Pynes, Domestic PartnershipBenefits: Dispelling the Myth, 15 REV.
PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 44, 51 (1995)).
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protects spouses; the status of members of unmarried
39
couples is unclear.
3. Inheritance and other death benefits. A member of a
married couple obtains a number of benefits at the time of
death. Default rules favor wives and husbands for those
who die without a will, and many states forbid people from
refusing to leave money to the person to whom they are
married. 40 Under the Uniform Probate Code, those who die
intestate give much of their estate to their spouse, even if
they had children. 41 In wrongful death actions, spouses
automatically qualify for benefits; the status of those in
42
unmarried couples is far less clear.
4. Ownership benefits. Under both state and federal law,
spouses may have automatic ownership rights that nonspouses lack. In community property states, people have
automatic rights to the holdings of their spouses, and they
cannot contract around the legal rules. Even in states that
do not follow community property rules, states may
presume joint ownership of property acquired after
marriage and before legal separation. The idea of tenancy
by the entirety may establish legal unity to married couples
in a way that also grants ownership benefits (and burdens)
43
to those involved.
5. Surrogate decisionmaking. Members of married couples
are given the right to make surrogate decisions of various

39 Compare Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 510 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (permitting a claim of loss of consortium when the couple is unmarried, based on a
foreseeability of cohabitation standard), and Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J.
1980) (finding that New Jersey law permits an unmarried cohabitant to file a claim for loss of
consortium), with Walsh v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 700 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(finding that New York law does not permit recovery for loss of consortium when the couple is
not married), and Gurliacci v. Mayer, 590 A.2d 914, 931 (Conn. 1990) (holding that claims for
loss of consortium are limited to spouses under Connecticut law).
40 See Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritanceand the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
84, 94-98 (1994) (describing how nine states, under their community property laws, require that
certain marital property be held as community property, half of which is automatically retained by
the surviving spouse upon the other's death).
41 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 1990); 8 U.L.A. § 2-102 (1997).
42 Under New York law, a spouse who married the decedent after the lethal injury was
inflicted can recover under the state's wrongful death statute. See Walsh, 700 F. Supp. at 785-86;
see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904(b) (2003) (if the deceased person has no
spouse, parents, or children, a person "substantially dependent" on the deceased can recover as a
secondary beneficiary). But see Holguin v. Flores, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 749, 759-60 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (under California law, while cohabitating same-sex couples have a statutory right to
recover for wrongful death, cohabitating heterosexual couples do not).
43 See, e.g., In re Estate of Suggs, 405 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 198 1) (describing that
a conveyance to spouses will by default create a tenancy by the entirety, while the same type of
conveyance to an unmarried couple will create a tenancy in common by default).
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sorts in the event of incapacitation. When an emergency
arises, a spouse is permitted to make judgments on behalf
of an incapacitated partner.4 4 More generally, a spouse
might be appointed formal guardian, entitled to make
decisions about care, residence, and money, as well as
45
about particular medical options.
6. Evidentiary privileges. Federal courts, and a number of
state courts, recognize marital privileges, including a right
to keep marital communications confidential and to
46
exclude adverse spousal testimony.
This catalogue includes a large set of benefits, and there are sharp
political constraints on any effort to rethink them; but certainly the state
is not constitutionally required to provide them. Suppose, for example,
that the state altered a host of laws to place married people closer to, or
on the same plane as, or even below unmarried couples or single people.
It defies belief to suggest that the alteration would be an
unconstitutional violation of the "right to marry." Recall that Zablocki
limited its holding to "direct and substantial interference" with the right
to marry; the Court expressly said that it did not mean to draw into
question laws that affect people's incentives to marry. The line the
Court meant to draw is not entirely clear, but at the very least, existing
doctrine does not require economic benefits to be provided to married
people as such.
But if the right to marry does not require a panoply of economic
benefits, what, exactly, does it entail? Perhaps it operates as a kind of
precondition for certain familial rights that continue to be material in a
sense but that are, broadly speaking, associational in character-the
right, for example, to visit and make choices for a loved one in case of
incapacitating illness. Under existing law, marriage is not literally a
precondition for these rights; but it usually makes their exercise
significantly easier. Is the state constitutionally obliged to provide the
institution of marriage so as to recognize these rights? Suppose that a
state refuses to license or to acknowledge marriages and denies
members of long-term relationships the right to make decisions on
behalf of their incapacitated partners in the hospital. There is a
plausible argument that the Due Process Clause forbids states from
disallowing such visits. 47 Or suppose that the state refuses to license or
44 See, e.g., Mark Fowler, Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 985, 992-95 (1984) (describing the rights of spouses and other family members
to make medical decisions on behalf of an incapacitated patient).
45 See Chambers, supra note 34, at 455.
46 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); State v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158
(Conn. 2004).
47 The argument seems afortiori after Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), which held
that there is a constitutional right, on the part of parents, to control visitation.
HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 2092 2004-2005

2005]

THE RIGHT TO MARRY

2093

to acknowledge marriages and denies people in long-term relationships
the right to adopt children. Serious constitutional questions would be
raised by the denial of that right. 48 Indeed, serious questions can be
raised by the denial of that right under existing law.
But none of this is an argument about marriage as such. So long as
official marriage exists, the state might be permitted to say that
marriage is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the enjoyment
of certain benefits, privileges, and default rules. 49 Indeed, one argument
for marriage is that the institution allows the ready creation of default
rules for otherwise unprovided-for cases. 50 If official marriage was
abolished, the Due Process Clause might give people a right to some of
the benefits and arrangements to which married people are ordinarily
entitled under existing state law. But this point does not suggest a right
to marriage. I conclude that the government is under no constitutional
duty to recognize marriage as a way of giving economic, associational,
or other material benefits to married couples.
What else, then, might an affirmative right to marry entail? The
only possible answer is expressive-a kind of official endorsement or
recognition of the marital relationship. Recall that in Turner, the Court
stressed that marriages are "expressions of emotional support and public
commitment." 51 If a state says that people are "married," then they are
in fact married, and not only for purposes of financial and other
benefits. They are married in the sense that the relationship is taken, by
everyone who knows about it, to have a particular quality as an official
matter. In short, marriage has an important signaling function, and
quite apart from material benefits, the official institution of marriage
entails a certain public legitimation and endorsement.
Consider two people who announce their marriage to the world, or
who seem to act as married couples do, or both, but with one wrinkle:
under state law, they are not in fact married. (Suppose too that they
have not been married through any formal ceremony, religious or
otherwise.) To be sure, people can become "engaged" simply by
announcing that fact. But to be married as a matter of formal law, they
must go through certain official procedures. 52 Does the right to marry
mean that the Constitution requires states to make those procedures
available? Perhaps it does. If so, the right to marry has some of the
features of the public forum doctrine, which requires the government to
48 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66.
49 But it might not be permitted to say that marriage is a necessary condition. See, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
50 I am grateful to Mary Anne Case for raising this point in several discussions.
51 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).
52 I put to one side the interesting case of common law marriages, where people are
sometimes permitted to become "marridd," within the view of the state, just by virtue of living
together for a long period.
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leave the streets and parks open for expressive activity. In the leading
case from the early part of the twentieth century, the Court said:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and time
out of mind, have been used for the purposes of assembly,
communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
53
liberties of citizens.
It is not entirely clear that the public forum doctrine forbids the
government from privatizing the streets and parks; but this view is far
from implausible. If we attend to the purposes of the public forum
doctrine, perhaps public streets and parks are constitutionally required,
so as to ensure something like "public spaces" in which free expression
can occur. Without such spaces, the system of free expression would be
badly compromised. 54 Perhaps marriage can be understood in similar
terms. On this view, states are under an obligation to make the marital
form available-not to give married people economic advantages, but to
give official recognition and endorsement to the marital relationship.
And on this view, what is at stake in the right to marry is expressive,
rather than material.
But in the end this argument seems unconvincing-and hence there
is probably no right to the institution of marriage as such. We are
speaking here of fundamental rights, and rights protected as such are
generally rights to be free from government intrusion; they do not
require affirmative provision by the state. 55 The right to choose
abortion, for example, forbids the state to impose legal barriers to the
right to choose, but it does not require the state to fund abortion. 56 For
the ordinary privacy rights with which marriage is associated, the
Constitution requires governmental noninterference; it does not require
the government to provide money, institutional arrangements, or
anything else.
Of course this analogy is not decisive. We could imagine a ruling
to the effect that the legal institution of marriage is so time-honored, and
so indispensable to family formation, that states must make it available.
But this argument would likely fall on deaf ears in any situation in
which marriage really was abolished. To see why, note the difficulty, at
the present time, of imagining a state that has actually abolished the
53 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
54 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLICCOM (2001).

55 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). There are
important qualifications. The right to private property and freedom of contract, for example,
require affirmative government action. See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST
OF RIGHTS (1999). I am speaking here in the conventional doctrinal terms.
56 See sources cited supra note 55.
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legal institution of marriage. This is difficult to imagine simply because
most people cherish that institution. If a state abolished marriage, it
would be because most people, or most influential people, had come to
believe that the institution should be abolished. In those circumstances,
the idea that there is a right to that institution would be difficult to
accept. I conclude, then, that whatever the content of the right to marry,
it does not include a right that the state maintain an official scheme for
recognizing and legitimating marriage.
A.

Outlawing Marriage?

The argument so far does not suggest that the state may "outlaw"
the institution of marriage without offense to the Constitution. Suppose,
for example, that a state said it would not only fail to recognize
marriages as such, but also that it would not permit private
organizations, religious and otherwise, to recognize marriages. (Why
would a state do this? Any answer would be fanciful under present
circumstances, but perhaps we could imagine a decision that the
institution causes more harm than good-an issue to which I will
return.) The initial question, a hard one, is what exactly this means.
Suppose that it is essentially expressive and terminological-that by
banning marriages, the state is not forbidding civil unions or relational
commitments via contract. If so, the ban on marriages is not so
different, analytically, from a refusal to recognize marriage as an
official matter. But suppose a state went further, deciding that it really
sought to "forbid marriage," among other things by refusing to allow its
ordinary background law to be used to create the expressive and
economic equivalents of marriage. As stated, this very idea is obscure,
but suppose that the state abolishes not only material benefits, but also
an effort to recreate, through private contract, the expressive equivalent
57
of state-sponsored marriage.
Here it is reasonable to say that a serious constitutional problem
would be raised under the "right to marry" cases-at least as these are
informed by cases recognizing a (narrow) right to intimate association. 58
To be sure, people do not have a right to contract on whatever terms
they choose, and the state has a great deal of power to intrude into
contractual relationships. But it is most doubtful that the Court would
permit states to abolish the formalization of intimate relationships
57 Virginia has apparently tried to do this in the case of same-sex marriages. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-45.3 (Michie 2004); sources cited infra note 69. I am grateful to Elizabeth Emens for
bringing this peculiar statute to my attention.
58 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Moore v. .City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977).
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through voluntary agreements.
Surely any such effort would be
unconstitutional, under the Free Exercise Clause, as applied to religious
institutions. And the Due Process Clause would almost certainly be
taken to invalidate efforts to forbid nonreligious "unions" created solely
for expressive purposes. Thus the constitutional right to marry does not
only provide access to an official institution; it also forbids state efforts
to interfere with certain private arrangements that recognize what the
parties consider to be the marital form.
B.

What the Right to Marry Is

My conclusion is that the "right to marry" entails both some right
of intimate association in the private sphere and (more relevantly for
present purposes) an individualright of access to the official institution
of marriageso long as the state provides that institution. With respect
to the access right, the best analogy is to the right to vote. As the
Constitution is now understood, states are not required to provide
elections for state offices. 59 But when elections are held, the right to
vote qualifies as fundamental, and state laws that deprive people of that
right will be strictly scrutinized and generally struck down. The
analogy between the right to marry and the right to vote is quite close.
In both cases, the state may not be required to create the practice in the
first instance. But so long as the practice exists, the state must make it
available to everyone.
The major difference is that the right to vote is unambiguously
protected under the "fundamental rights" branch of equal protection
doctrine, 60 whereas the right to marry has not been squarely placed
there, rather than under the Due Process Clause itself. And insofar as
the Court has suggested that the right to marry has due process
foundations, that right does emerge as unusual, even unique. The Due
Process Clause provides, substantively, no other right to an institution
that government is permitted to abolish. Substantive due process rights
in the same general area, such as the right to freedom from
governmental interference in the domain of consensual sex, are very
different. As I have said, those rights involve a right to freedom from
government intrusion, rather than a right of access to a state-created
practice. And this very point suggests that the Court has erred insofar
as it has treated the right to marry as part of substantive due process
rather than as part of the fundamental rights branch of equal protection
doctrine. The latter course is a far more sensible way of analyzing the
59 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Simms,

377 U.S. 533 (1964).
60 See, e.g., Harper,383 U.S. at 667; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62.
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question. Apparently the Court went off track because of the intuitive
connection between sexuality and reproduction (protected by
substantive due process) and marriage (not easily analyzed in the same
terms). I conclude that the right to marry should be seen as part of the
fundamental rights branch of equal protection doctrine, rather thar. as
substantive due process.
But this conclusion raises a serious question of its own. Why does
the right to marry so qualify? In fact it is not at all easy to explain, in
general, why some rights qualify as fundamental for equal protection
purposes. The Equal Protection Clause seems to forbid certain kinds of
discrimination; it does not appear to create fundamental rights of any
kind. With the right to vote, perhaps we can say that the answer is
internal to the right itself: the right to vote, to count as such, must be
provided equally to all. On one view, political equality and the right to
vote should be taken to entail one another. If some people are not
permitted to vote, or if effective barriers are created so as to ensure that
some people's votes count more than others, or if the right of access to
voting is compromised, then the idea of political equality is
undermined; and that idea is integral to the voting itself. I do not mean
to say that this argument is ultimately convincing. I mean only to
suggest that if the right to vote qualifies as fundamental for equal
protection purposes, it is because there is something in that right that, by
its very nature, calls for equality in its distribution.
The same cannot be said of the right to marry. There is nothing
internal to that right that calls for its equal distribution. If the right to
marry qualifies as fundamental for equal protection purposes, it must be
simply by virtue of its importance-an idea that does have resonances
in some of the fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection
Clause. 6 1 But this idea itself raises further complexities. On what scale
of importance does marriage so qualify, when welfare benefits and
housing do not (as the Court has held)? 62 Perhaps we can answer that
importance is not all that is involved, and that the central idea is that for
interests of certain kinds-perhaps those connected with family
formation-the state is under an obligation of powerful justifications
whenever it imposes selective restrictions or curtailments.
Suppose that the point is accepted. It remains to ask what, in
particular, makes the right to marry special in a constitutionally relevant
sense. The first answer, a tempting one, would point to the material
incidents of marriage. As I have noted, a large number of benefits
accompany the marital relationship. Some of these can be provided by
explicit agreements, but others (such as tax benefits and family leave
61 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
62 See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471

(1970).
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benefits) require official marriage. But on reflection, these material
benefits cannot be the basis for the view that marriage counts as a
fundamental right. Material benefits of the most fundamental kind are
involved in many programs involving welfare and subsistence; and
under current doctrine, they do not qualify as fundamental for equal
protection purposes. 63 Hence it would be extremely odd to say that the
marital benefits of marriage by themselves are enough to give the right
to marry the status of a fundamental right.
A second answer, suggested by Zablocki, is that marriage is a legal
precondition for certain other rights that do have constitutional status,
including the right to engage in sexual relations and to procreate. And
if Zablocki is taken at face value, this answer is certainly plausible. But
it faces two serious problems. The first is Turner, which understands
the right to marry in terms that have nothing to do with the enjoyment
of other privacy rights. The second is Lawrence v. Texas,64 which
recognizes a freestanding right to engage in sexual relations-a right
that exists outside of the context of marriage. In the end, this second
answer is impossible to accept, even though it is supported by some of
the language of Zablocki.
This leaves only one possibility: the right to marry counts as
fundamental, for equal protection purposes, because of the expressive
benefits that come from official, state-licensed marriage. In a sense,
this too is an odd conclusion. In no other context is a purely or even
largely expressive reason a sufficient basis for giving special
constitutional protection to an interest. And the expressive benefits of
marriage are contingent on a particular constellation of social norms;
there is nothing inevitable about them. In a different society, for
example, the expressive benefits would be much lower. In fact
American society is moving in that direction. All I am suggesting is
that the underlying logic of the right to marry has everything to do with
the fundamental importance of the expressive interests at stake.
III.

OF

SYMBOLIC AND MATERIAL INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE

A.

The Content of the Right

As a matter of state law, the institution of marriage contains both
material and expressive incidents. And the discussion thus far should
be enough to suggest that when the Supreme Court says that there is a
right to marriage, it is not claiming that there is merely a right to the
63 See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 69-74; Dandridge,397 U.S. at 485-87.
64 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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material incidents of marriage. Suppose that a white person and an
African-American seek to marry, and that a state says that such
relationships can be formed as civil unions but not as marriages.
Suppose too that civil unions have all the legal incidents of marriage. It
is clear that under Loving, this form of discrimination would violate the
Due Process Clause as well as the Equal Protection Clause. The state
cannot deny interracial couples the right to marry merely by insisting
that it is providing such couples with the right to the material incidents
of marriage. So too, a state could not say that unless they have met their
child support obligations, people may enter into civil unions but not
marriage.
Nor-though the question is harder-could a state agree to
provide, for some rather than all, the expressive benefits of marriage but
not its material ones. Certainly a state could not say that mixed race
couples can "marry," but without receiving the material advantages that
normally flow from marriage. What makes this question more difficult
is that it is imaginable that a state could legitimately vary the material
benefits of marriage with the features of that particular marriage. A
state might say, for example, that people married for a certain period of
time qualify for community property arrangements-but not until that
time has passed. More controversially, perhaps a state might say that
those who owe child support obligations may marry, but that the
amounts due, for child support, supersede any spousal rights. Nothing
in Zablocki renders adjustments of this kind unconstitutional. But-and
this is the central point-such adjustments must be tailored to relevant
facts about the situation; the material benefits of marriage cannot be
used as a weapon by which to penalize some and to reward others.
Hence the Court's opinions seem to mean that for those who enjoy it,
the right to marry conveys a right of access to the symbolic and the
material benefits of marriage, so long as the institution of marriage
exists. In the cases involving the right to marry, and subject to the
qualifications just given, a denial of either the symbolic or the material
benefits of marriage would be impermissible.
B.

Permissions and Prohibitions

Notwithstanding the Court's rhetoric, however, it seems
implausible to suggest that the Court meant to raise serious questions
about all state laws dictating who may enter into a marital relationship.
To approach the question, and to prepare the way for a discussion of the
scope of the right to marry, it is necessary to distinguish between two
possibilities:
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(1) The state does not allow certain people to enter into the marital
relationship as that relationship is officially understood, but it does not
ban those people from conducting unofficial marriage ceremonies and
even from holding themselves out as married, so long as they do not
seek the material benefits that flow from official recognition of that
status.
(2) The state does not allow certain people to enter into the marital
relationship as officially understood; and it also outlaws, through
criminal or civil sanctions, the performance of marriage ceremonies by
such people, and bans them from holding themselves out as married.
The first approach involves a mere refusal to recognize certain
marriages; the second involves a prohibition on them. It should be
obvious that the two must be treated differently.
1.

A Little Law

As an official matter, state laws distinguish among marriages that
are void, voidable, and criminal. When a marriage is void, it is invalid
from its inception. *In Illinois, for example, same-sex marriages are
void, 65 as are those which are incestuous 66 or polygamous. 67 New York
voids polygamous and incestuous marriages from their inception. 68
Incestuous marriages are defined to include those between an ancestor
and descendant; brothers and sisters of the whole or half blood; an uncle
and a niece or an aunt and a nephew. (Marriages between cousins are
legitimate under New York law.) Notably, one state-Virginia-voids
not only same-sex marriages but contracts designed to create same-sex
unions.
A civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between
persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or
obligations of marriage is prohibited. Any such civil union,
partnership contract or other arrangement entered into by persons of
the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all
respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall
be void and unenforceable. 69
65 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (2004); see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Flores, 421
N.E.2d 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
66 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (2004); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (2004).
67 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (2004); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 4
(West 2004).
68 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 5-6 (Consol. 2004).
69 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (Michie 2004). This provision contains a good deal of
ambiguity. What does it mean for a contract to purport "to bestow the privileges or obligations of
marriage?" Insofar as those privileges or obligations can be granted by positive law, and not by
voluntary agreement, no contract could bestow them. On the other hand, some of those privileges
and obligations-for example, the right to make decisions in one's stead in the event of
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Some marriages, while not void, can be annulled at the behest of
either spouse. Marriages are voidable if they occurred under duress
(through coercion, fraud, or the threat of force) or if one member is
either physically or mentally incapable of entering into the marriage
relation. 70 For fraud, many courts apply a strict test, "requiring that the
misrepresentation go to the 'essentials' to render the marriage
voidable.' '7 1 Others merely require that the fraud be material to the
marriage. 72 Violation of the minimal age requirement typically makes a
marriage voidable. In New York, if either spouse is under age eighteen
at the time of the marriage, then the marriage is voidable for lack of
consent. 73 And if either spouse has an incurable mental illness, then the
74
marriage can be voided at either party's request. Frequently, physical
incapacity, defined as the inability to have sexual relations, renders a
marriage voidable; the inability must exist at the time of marriage and
be incurable.
There are also criminal sanctions for entering into some marriages.
In New York, a person commits the crime of "incest when he or she
marries ...a person whom he or she knows to be related to him or her,
either legitimately or out of wedlock, as an ancestor, descendant,
brother or sister of either the whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt,
nephew or niece. ' 75 Other states similarly criminalize incestuous
marriages. 76 It follows that to commit incest, sexual relations with a
relative are not necessary; marrying one suffices for criminal liability.
New York defines the crime of bigamy more precisely than incest: "A
person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a
when he has a living spouse, or
marriage with another person at a time
77
the other person has a living spouse."

incapacitation-might be provided by ordinary contracts. It is not clear whether the Virginia
statute is intended to make those contracts "void" in the case of same-sex relationships.
70 Id. § 7.
71 D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN

APPLETON,

MODERN

FAMILY LAW: CASES AND

MATERIALS 218 (2d ed. 1998).
72 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7 (Consol. 2004); see also Sabbagh v. Copti, 251 A.D.2d 149
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that misleading a wife into marrying by pretending to want
children was grounds for an annulment).
73 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7.
74 Id.

75 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.25 (Consol. 2004).
76 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-27 (2004);

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 17 (West 2004).
77 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.15 (Consol. 2004); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-13 (2004).
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Relevant Differences: Bans v. Nonrecognition

Is there a difference, for constitutional purposes, among
criminalizing a marriage, making it void, and making it voidable? In
principle there should be. One reason that marriages are voidable is that
there is a problem with consent; and if one of the parties complains that
consent was absent, there is no constitutional problem with taking the
complaint seriously.
And if a state refuses to recognize certain
marriages, it might be doing so because of its desire not to confer the
economic benefits of marriages in circumstances in which such benefits
are not justified. A state might believe, for example, that two-person
marriages provide the only plausible justification for many or most of
those benefits. If a state refuses to confer the economic benefits of
marriage for this reason, but fails to criminalize purely private
marriages, the issue is surely different from what it would be if a state
imposed a criminal ban. I am not suggesting that criminal bans on
polygamy are unconstitutional;7 8 I am suggesting only that a refusal to
license marriages is less intrusive than a criminal ban.
In many cases, a state might believe, not that those who participate
in certain marriages should be subject to criminal sanctions, but that it
does not want to confer expressive legitimacy on those marriages. It
might believe, for example, that same-sex marriages do not deserve the
same social approval as opposite-sex marriages; hence many people
think that same-sex couples should be permitted to enter into civil
unions but not into marriage. It would be possible to think that states
have an adequate justification for rendering marriages void, but not for
banning them, if performed by private organizations, religious or
otherwise. A prohibition on private religious ceremonies allowing, for
example, same-sex marriages, would raise serious questions under the
Free Exercise Clause; and a ban on private ceremonies, even without a
religious component, would raise questions of substantive due process.
To say this is not to say that existing criminal prohibitions are
generally or even mostly invalid. In general, the ban on incestuous
marriages could be defended by pointing to the risk of coercion and the
danger to any children who would result. 79 But it is easy to imagine
some cases in which any such defense would be weak-as, for example,
where the would-be spouses are both adults and do not plan to have
children. Perhaps bans on polygamy could be defended by pointing to

78 They were upheld in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
79 For skeptical remarks on those harms, see Courtney Cahill, "What is Our Bane, That Alone
We Have in Common ": Incest, Intimacy, and the Crisis of Naming, 21 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 3

(2000).
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80 It is easy
the risk of exploitation, especially of the women involved.
to imagine a claim that if polygamy is permitted, women will be
subordinated as a result. But this claim might be contested, and in any
case it is doubtful whether Loving and Zablocki should be read to
require a careful judicial inquiry into that question. That doubt makes it
necessary to turn to the question of the scope of the right to marry.

IV.

THE MINIMAL RIGHT TO MARRY

Begin with a minimal understanding of the scope of the relevant
right. By deeming the right to marry fundamental, the Court did not
mean to suggest that it would strictly scrutinize any law that departed
from the traditional idea that a marriage is between (one) woman and
(one) man. It meant only to say that when a man and a woman seek to
marry, the state must have exceedingly good reasons for putting
significant barriers in their path. Thus the minimal understanding of the
right to marry says that without very good reason, states may not deny
an adult man and an adult woman access to the institution of marriage.
This rationale has the advantage of fitting with the results in Loving,
Zablocki, and Turner. It has the further advantage of not drawing into
question bans on polygamous marriages or marriages between people
and cats.
A.

Problems and Conventions

But the minimal understanding does run into two problems. First,
it might turn out to be less minimal than it appears, for one simple
reason: it raises serious questions about bans on incestuous marriages.
If this problem is deemed serious, two options are available. The right
might be described more narrowly still: without very good reason, states
may not deny an adult man and an adult woman access to the institution
of marriage, unless the relevant marriage runs afoul of longstanding
views about who may enter into the marital relationship. This extraminimalist understanding of the right to marry also fits with the Court's
decisions, and it would ensure that the Court would uphold any
restriction that is not novel (as were those in Zablocki and Turner)-a
benefit for those who believe in a cautious judicial role in this domain.
Alternatively, bans on incestuous marriages might be permitted only if
they can be compellingly justified-and struck down if they cannot be.
80 But see Emens, supra note 3, at 332-34 (describing some of the arguments made by legal
scholars and economists in favor of polygamy).
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Thus, for example, an uncle might not be permitted to marry his niece
simply because of the risk of coercion and psychological harm. But a
ban on marriage between cousins might well be struck down.
The second problem with the minimal understanding is much more
formidable. The lines it draws might seem arbitrary in principle. Why,
exactly, should the right to marry be limited in this way? Why, in any
case, should the definition be such as to require the state to give a strong
justification for any law that forbids marriage between one woman and
one man-but not to give a strong justification for any other law that
impinges on marital choices?
A possible answer would be that marriage is a legal status, one
whose scope depends on nothing more than conventions. The Court, on
this view, has not been willing to revisit the question of what marriage
is; it has worked entirely within the convention on that count. But are
conventions really determinative? Suppose that a white person and an
African-American seek to marry, and a state responds (in, say, 1965)
that they cannot marry, because marriage is defined as, or is
conventionally understood as, a legal relationship between people of the
same race. The mere fact that there is a convention to this effect cannot
be decisive. The convention is constitutionally unacceptable. There are
countless conventions, and their legal legitimacy depends on whether
they fit with the Constitution; their status as conventions cannot resolve
that question.
But perhaps this conclusion depends fundamentally on the
antidiscrimination principles of the Equal Protection Clause. Perhaps
the convention is authoritative unless it draws distinctions that offend
that clause. Compare the idea of "parent," insofar as that idea has legal
relevance. If I am the biological parent of a child, the state must have
an extremely good reason to sever my relationship with that child. If I
have adopted a child, the state must do the same. But suppose that
someone claims that he wants to be "father" of his dog, or his horse, or
his best friend, or his grandfather. (What does this mean? Suppose it
means that the claimant seeks the expressive benefits of being a parent,
the material benefits and burdens of parenthood, or both.)
The
prohibition on parental status, in such cases, need not be compellingly
justified. 8 1 Perhaps it is sufficient to say that to be a parent, it is
necessary to fit within certain conventional categories. But I do not
think that this is sufficient.
If the convention, with respect to
parenthood, drew invidious or irrational lines, it would be
impermissible. If there is a distinction in terms of liberty alone, the real
point is that for a biological or adoptive parent, state intervention
imposes a loss that is distinctive in both degree and kind. That loss
81 Note that frequently there is no such prohibition. Adults can sometimes adopt adults; in
fact adults can sometimes adopt adults who are older than they are.
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counts as a deprivation of liberty that must be compellingly justified.
No such loss is involved when someone is prevented from becoming the
parent of his dog, or his horse, or his best friend, or his grandfather.
(What, exactly, is lost by that?)
Marriage is quite different. If a man is told that he cannot marry
another man, it is not so frivolous to suggest that the same loss is
imposed on him as in Loving, Zablocki, and Turner. The same may
well be true if someone is told that she cannot have two spouses. The
claim here is not that the relevant restrictions are unconstitutional. It is
only that they cannot be defended by reference to convention alone.
B.

Due Process Traditionalism

Apart from convention, what might be said in favor of the minimal
understanding of the right to marry? The initial answer is rooted in
constitutional traditionalism. The central claim would be that in its
substantive form, the Due Process Clause is backward-looking; it
requires the state to justify any departure from longstanding views about
individual rights. 82 This view can find its foundation in Justice Holmes'
famous dissenting opinion in the Lochner case, where he urged not that
substantive process should be eliminated, but that it should apply only
in cases involving departures from longstanding traditions. 83 Justice
8 4
Holmes' position was prominently reiterated in Bowers v. Hardwick
85
and Washington v. Glucksberg, where the Court suggested that the
reach of the Due Process Clause should be defined with close reference
to American traditions. And it is not difficult to understand why the
Court might see the Due Process Clause in this way. A decision to root
substantive due process in traditions, narrowly understood, might be the
best way of reducing judicial mistakes and judicial burdens (in
economic terminology, the costs of errors and the costs of decisions).
Let us see how this argument might be spelled out.
The idea of "substantive due process" is textually awkward, to say
the least, 86 and doubts about its constitutional legitimacy might well
lead the Court to attempt to reduce its reach. Quite apart from the
textual problem, the notion of substantive due process seems hard to
cabin. Which liberty rights count as special, for due process purposes?
If this question is not easy to answer, the Court might be drawn to due
82 1 try to defend this view in Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution:A
Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161
(1988).
83 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
84 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

.

85 521 U.S. 707 (1997).
86 See J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1983).
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process traditionalism simply as a way of sharply disciplining itself. Of
course traditions are not self-defining; they do not come prepackaged
for easy identification. 87 And hence it is tempting to object that
constitutional traditionalism is a fraud, in which the key value
judgment-how should the tradition be defined?-ends up doing all the
work. 88 But the objection is overstated. If traditions are understood at
the lowest possible level of abstraction, 89 then their use imposes a real
limitation on judicial discretion. We should be able to agree, for
example, that in the United States, there is no tradition of respect for
incestuous marriages, or homosexual marriages, or marriages that
involve more than two people. Thus the emphasis on tradition,
described at a maximum specificity, might be defended on the ground
that it reduces the burdens of judicial judgment, making substantive due
process into something much closer to a system of rules. 90
On a plausible view, moreover, the discipline imposed by tradition
is far from arbitrary. Suppose that we believe, with Edmund Burke, 9'
that traditions are likely to be wise, simply because they represent the
judgment not of a single person, but of countless people over a long
period of time. If so, then traditions have some of the advantages of
markets, reflecting the assessments of many rather than few. To say
this is not to say that longstanding practices are always justified. They
might reflect prejudice or unjustified inequalities in power rather than
wisdom. But perhaps practices are likely to be longstanding only if they
serve important social interests; if so, there should be a presumption in
their favor. It is certainly not senseless to say that if American states
have generally refused to recognize certain marriages, there is reason to
think that the refusal has some sense behind it.
In any case the question is not whether longstanding practices
always deserve support, measured against the best answer to that
question on the merits.
The question is instead an insistently
comparative one: for judges interpreting the Due Process Clause is
constitutional traditionalism preferable to an alternative approach, in
which, for example, judges pay close attention to their own judgments
about liberty, or judgments of an evolving public? 92 If we believe that
87 See

CASS

R.

SUNSTEIN,

Against Tradition, in

DESIGNING

DEMOCRACY:

WHAT

CONSTITUTIONS Do 67 (2002).
88 See Jack Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, I1 CARDOZO L.
REV.

1613 (1990); LAWRENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION

(1991).
89 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.).
90 Thus there is a clear link between Justice Scalia's embrace of tradition, read at a level of
great specificity, and his enthusiasm for binding judges via rules. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997).
91 See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Charles Posner ed.,

1968).
92 See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretationand Institutions, 110 MICH. L.
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judges are prone to err, an effort to root substantive due process in
traditions might well be better than any alternative. Seen in this light,
due process traditionalism has a kind of rule-utilitarian defense.
Compared to other approaches, it may be likely to reduce both the costs
of decision and the costs of error. And even if we believe that judicial
decisions have some advantages, we might agree that in the face of
doubt, democratic judgments, especially in a federal system, deserve a
measure of respect, in part because self-government is one of the rights
to which people are entitled.
For all of these reasons, due process traditionalism is far from
irrational or arbitrary, even if it produces results that can be
characterized as such in particular cases. And if we are due process
traditionalists, we might insist that if there is a right to marry, it includes
only the time-honored form: one man and one woman. On this reading,
Loving v. Virginia is best seen as a simple equal protection ruling; if it
has a substantive due process component as well, this is because the ban
on racial intermarriage offended the minimal understanding. But even
if it can be defended in principle, due process traditionalism has a
serious doctrinal obstacle: Lawrence v. Texas.93 Any judgment about
the scope of the right to marry must come to terms with what the Court
said in Lawrence; and this is no simple matter.

C.

OfA utonomy andDesuetude

The simplest point is that in Lawrence the Court expressly rejected
the idea that substantive due process is limited to practices that have
long received respect. Striking down a state law forbidding same-sex
relationships, the Court freely conceded that there is no history of
accepting those relationships. On the contrary, and in a dramatic
departure from both Bowers v. Hardwick and Washington v.
Glucksberg, the Court said that longstanding traditions are not decisive.
Current convictions are important, not old ones. "[W]e think that our
laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance
here. ' 94 Hence the Court stressed an "emerging recognition that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
'95
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."
On its face, of course, this conclusion does not bear on the right to
marry. Perhaps there is a distinction between "matters pertaining to
sex," properly conceived as private, and the marital institution, which
REV. 885 (2003); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (2000).
93 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
94 Id. at 571.

95 Id.
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requires official decisions by the state. But Lawrence raises some
problems for a minimal understanding of the right to marry. It suggests
that due process traditionalism is dead-and hence that the minimal
understanding of that right cannot be defended by reference to tradition
alone.
On the other hand, a narrow reading of Lawrence-one that also
confines the reach of substantive due process-is possible. Perhaps a
right qualifies for substantive protection under the Due Process Clause
either if it has a claim in longstanding traditions or if it is firmly rooted
in society's "emerging recognition. '9 6 Of course this view has serious
problems of its own. Is the Court reliably able to identify emerging
recognitions? And if some recognition really is emerging, might it not
be vindicated democratically, rather than judicially? Why should the
Supreme Court, rather than legislatures, have the task of insisting on
emerging recognitions? One answer would see Lawrence as a case
about an American version of desuetude 97-as a prohibition on the use
of the criminal law in circumstances in which the underlying conduct
did not offend citizens' moral commitments, as reflected in a pattern of
nonenforcement. In those circumstances, the statutory ban in Lawrence
was a recipe for arbitrary and even discriminatory action, in a way that
does violence to democratic ideals and even the rule of law. It does
violence to democratic ideals because a law plainly lacking public
support is nonetheless invoked to regulate private conduct. It violates
the rule of law because a measure of this kind lacks, in practice, the
kind of generality and predictability on which the rule of law depends. 98
If this is the foundation for Lawrence, then the decision, while fatal
to due process traditionalism, is not at all fatal to the minimal reading of
the right to marry. It is not fatal to that reading because no problem of
desuetude is involved. Indeed, no such problem is involved even if the
idea of desuetude could be extended beyond the criminal law. Even if
so, almost all states refuse to recognize marriages that exceed the
minimal understanding; and because the refusal is widespread, it is
acceptable. Indeed, Lawrence might be read to reach beyond the realm
of desuetude to embody a general project of judicial modernization,
involving not simply substantive due process but equal protection and
cruel and unusual punishment as well.99 But even if that general project
is embraced (of course a controversial matter), it does not justify, at the

96 See David A. Strauss, Modernization and Representation Reinforcement: An Essay in
Memory of John Hart Ely, 57 STAN. L. REv. 761 (2004), for a discussion of "modernization" in
connection with Lawrence.
97 See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? OfAutonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage,2003 SUP. CT. REV..27.
98 See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1962).
99 See the illuminating and suggestive treatment in Strauss, supra note 96.
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present time, judicial rulings that go beyond the minimal understanding
of the right to marry.

D.

Rationality,Arbitrariness,Invidiousness

Lawrence has a great deal of ambiguity, and some people might be
tempted to understand the decision in a way that suggests a broad
autonomy principle, 10 0 one that might well jeopardize the minimal
understanding. To clarify the issue, imagine a maximal understanding
of the scope of the right to marry: two or more people have a right of
access to the marital relationship, with its expressive and material
incidents, unless the relevant restriction is supported by compelling
justifications. It should not be so difficult to imagine a parallel world,
perhaps not so radically different from our own, in which the maximal
understanding were accepted. In such a world, people could deem
themselves married, and receive the appropriate license from the state,
so long as force and fraud were not involved. Religious marriages and
official licensing would be entirely severed. Approval and disapproval
would operate through norms, not through law.
Should this
understanding be accepted? What would be the implications?
For many two-person marriages that are currently void, voidable,
or criminal, compelling justifications for restricting marriage are
present, and hence the relevant prohibitions would be upheld even under
the maximal understanding.
Thus prohibitions on nonconsensual
marriages are plainly legitimate; so too with marriages involving people
who are underage, and most incestuous marriages. Just as under the
minimal understanding, some incestuous marriages would be in trouble
under the maximal understanding; but most would not. The real
difference between the minimal and the maximal understanding
operates along only two dimensions. First, the latter eliminates the
numerosity requirement. 10 1 Second, the latter eliminates the ban on
same-sex marriages. There is no sign that the first step will attract any
interest from federal or state judges; the second step is of course an
active area of controversy, at least in the state courts and in democratic
02

arenas. 1

100 See Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004).
101 Cf Emens, supra note 3, at 284 (discussing that requirement but without reference to the
institution of marriage).
102 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Goodridge relied on
the Massachusetts Constitution to strike down bans on same-sex marriages. My cautionary notes
here, about the need for judicial deference, are strongest in the context of federal judicial
decisions, which by hypothesis have national application; there is far more room for
experimentation within state courts, especially because states can allocate authority to their own
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If the maximal understanding were adopted, the numerosity
requirement would come under severe pressure. Put to one side the fact
that it is fanciful to suppose that such pressure might be imposed in the
near future. What would happen if it were? The question is whether
states could produce compelling justifications for refusing to recognize
marriages of three or more people. An initial justification would
suggest that many of the material benefits of marriage make sense only
for couples. To come to terms with this justification, we would have to
go through those benefits one by one. Very likely, federal and state
governments would be able to support their refusal to give joint filing
privileges to four-person "marriages"; such privileges might produce
substantial tax benefits for no sufficient reason. Perhaps states could
compellingly justify the decision to withhold some, but not all, of the
material incidents of marriage from polygamous relationships. But
even if so, the maximal understanding might nonetheless require states
to recognize certain relationships as "marital" for expressive reasons. In
other words, acceptance of the maximal understanding would make it
necessary to distinguish between the material and expressive incidents
of marriage-and also to treat the various material incidents as distinct.
But these points do not capture the real reason that polygamous
relationships cannot be deemed "marriages." Note here that most states
do not merely refuse to recognize them as such; they also impose
criminal penalties on those who participate in them. All this is because
the state believes that polygamous relationships cause individual and
social harm and in any case are immoral. Under the maximal
understanding, however, states must produce compelling justifications
for the relevant laws. 0 3 Should they be required to do so?
I do not believe so. A central reason is institutional; the maximal
understanding would place courts in a position for which they are
extremely ill-suited. It would require them to assume the exceptionally
difficult task of policing the adequacy of official justifications for
refusing to recognize marriages that involve more than two people.
Those justifications are best evaluated democratically, not judicially. If
this objection is convincing, then we can imagine an intermediate
understanding of the scope of the right to marry: two adults have a right

courts as they wish, and because state constitutions are more readily amended than the national
Constitution is. In my view, it would have been far better if gay marriage had been authorized
democratically rather than judicially, even in Massachusetts; but there is less reason for
institutional objections if state courts are involved. In fact aggressive decisions by state courts
have the advantage of ensuring a degree of experimentation (subject to democratic override). If
one or more states recognize less traditional marriages, it will be possible to see how they work
out in practice, and hence to evaluate the objections of those who fear adverse social
consequences.
103 Even if we put marriage to one side, Lawrence raises serious questions about statutory bans
on polygamous relationships so long as they are voluntary.
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of access to the marital relationship, with its expressive and material
incidents, unless the relevant restriction is supported by compelling
justifications. Is this understanding preferable from the constitutional
point of view? How should that question be answered?
E.

From Due Process to Equal Protection

One route is doctrinal. In specifying the scope of the right to
marry, the real question is the legitimacy of the lines that states draw. If
that is the question, it is appropriate to consult not the Due Process
Clause, but the antidiscrimination principles of the Equal Protection
Clause, which is the provision that places certain forms of line-drawing
in constitutional doubt. In fact the Due Process Clause is ill-adapted,
almost comically so, to making an assessment of appropriate lines. By
contrast, that assessment is a central part of the historic office of the
Equal Protection Clause.
If there is a problem with minimal understandings of the scope of
the right to marry, it is that those understandings draw lines that are
either arbitrary or invidious. Those who object to the relevant lines are
making arguments about equality; and no one can deny that Lawrence
had a great deal to do with equality. And this is entirely appropriate,
simply because the Equal Protection Clause is a self-conscious
repudiation of traditions that embody illicit line-drawing, making
distinctions that are arbitrary or invidious.' 0 4 The Equal Protection
Clause stands for a commitment to public reason-giving that puts
traditions to the test. As I have noted, the Due Process Clause has had a
quite different function. The purpose of that clause has generally been
to protect time-honored practices from governmental intrusion. The
Due Process Clause, in short, is the Constitution's bow in the direction
of Burke; the Equal Protection Clause is its testimonial to the French
Revolution.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not consistently adhered to this
distinction. Far from it. In Lawrence, in particular, the Court was
willing to understand the Due Process Clause in a way that understood
the tradition by reference to evolving values-and hence that
generalized the tradition, rather than relying on the specific judgments
that it had long made. If the awkwardness of the whole idea of
substantive due process is put to one side, there is no a priori reason to
think that this is an unacceptable use of the Due Process Clause. But if
the clause is to be used in this way, it is really because of a kind of
equal protection component to the due process inquiry-one that
104 This argument is sketched in Sunstein, supra note 82, at 1174-75.
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involves an evaluation, by federal courts, of the lines that traditions
have drawn. If so, then the due process inquiry, testing the legitimacy
of relevant lines, replicates the equal protection inquiry, but in a more
indirect form. Perhaps it is appropriate for federal courts, under the Due
Process Clause, to posit some general value (say, sexual autonomy) and
to assess particular practices in light of that value. But at least there is
some sense in being direct and explicit about the matter-of
acknowledging that an equality norm is being brought to bear on the
question whether the tradition should be understood at a level of great
specificity or a somewhat higher level of abstraction. I am suggesting,
then, that judgments about the scope of the right to marry ought to be
made with close attention to the Equal Protection Clause.
Do bans on same-sex marriage violate that clause? 10 5 To answer
that question, the question of constitutional principle must be
distinguished from the question of appropriate judicial decisions. In
principle, I believe that it is not easy to defend this form of
discrimination against gays and lesbians in constitutionally acceptable
terms. What sorts of social harms would follow from recognizing
marriages between people of the same sex? It is conventional to argue
that the refusal to recognize same-sex marriage is a way of protecting
the marital institution itself. If same-sex marriages were permitted,
perhaps marriage itself would be endangered, at least in its traditional
form. But aside from simple semantic arguments, this is very puzzling;
how do same-sex marriages threaten the institution of marriage?
Extending the right to enter into marriage would not seem to endanger
traditional marriages-unless it were thought that significant numbers
of heterosexuals would forego traditional marriages if gay and lesbian
marriages were permitted (a difficult causal argument, to say the least).
Or perhaps same-sex marriages would harm children-an
empirical claim on which there is much dispute. 0 6 Do we really have
enough evidence of harm to justify a ban?
Perhaps a kind of
precautionary principle 0 7 could be sufficient, suggesting that societies
should not play dice with children even if the evidence is speculative or
unclear-an idea that should almost certainly survive rationality review,
even with the complication that states that disallow same-sex marriages
sometimes permit gay adoptions. If it is possible to question whether
children do as well with gay or lesbian couples, perhaps states have
sufficient grounds to ban gay or lesbian marriages. But under strict
105 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 87.
106 See George W. Dent, Traditional Marriage Still Worth Defending, 18 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L.
419, 428, 432 (2004) (claiming that "[t]raditional marriage is the best context for raising
children," a notion that social scientists have set out to prove empirically, because same-sex
marriage will sever the connection between marriage and child rearing).
107 On the role of that principle is environmental law, see CASS R. SUNSTEtN, LAWS OF FEAR:
BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005).
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scrutiny, speculation is not enough; and in any case the argument at
most justifies a ban on gay adoptions, and not on gay marriages.
Countless people believe that the state can legitimately reserve the
idea of marriage to men and women for expressive reasons. Perhaps the
state can urge that it does not want to give the same expressive support
to same-sex unions as to opposite-sex unions. Perhaps it does not want
to "endorse" such unions or to suggest that they are appropriate or
legitimate, or have a standing similar to that of traditional marriage.
But why not? Why should states refuse to endorse such unions?
Compare the case of adultery, where the defense of traditional marriage
and expressive condemnation are far easier to understand. As compared
to a ban on same-sex marriages, a prohibition on adultery seems simple
to justify. Such a prohibition is likely, in numerous cases, to protect one
or even both spouses, while also protecting children. If, as seems clear,
Lawrence draws prohibitions on adultery into some doubt, it would
seem much harder to invoke expressive condemnation in support of
prohibitions on same-sex marriage, which have a far weaker foundation
in the goal of protecting traditional marriage.
For those who believe that the ban on same-sex marriages raises a
serious equality problem, a key problem is institutional. It involves
appropriate judicial modesty in the face of strong public convictions and
in particular the distinctive judicial virtue of prudence. As Alexander
Bickel emphasized, the point is highly relevant to constitutional law,
especially in the area of social reform.108 As it operates in the courts,
constitutional law is a peculiar mixture of substantive theory and
Constitutional rights are systematically
institutional constraint.
"underenforced" by the judiciary, and for excellent institutional
reasons. 109 Those reasons have to do with the courts' limited
factfinding capacities, their weak democratic pedigree, their limited
legitimacy, and their likely ineffectiveness as frequent instigators of
social reform. There are strong prudential reasons for federal courts to
hesitate in the context of same-sex marriage, not least because the issue
of same-sex marriage is under intense discussion at the local, state, and
national levels-and there are many possibilities, ranging from diverse
forms of civil unions to ordinary marriage. Some platitudes are worth
repeating: a central advantage of a federal system is that it permits a
wide range of experiments; a central disadvantage of centralized rules is
that they foreclose such experiments. In the context of criminal
punishments for consensual activity, experiments should be avoided.
But in the context of marriage, a degree of flexibility should not be
forbidden by federal courts.
108 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

(1965).

109 Cf Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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As in the context of abortion, it would be most unfortunate if the
Supreme Court settled the issue at this early stage. In fact the Court
gave fresh support to this idea in its standing decision in Elkgrove
Unified School District v. Newdow, involving a challenge to the use of
the words "under God" in the pledge of allegiance." 0 The Court
emphasized that among "the principal areas in which this Court has
customarily declined to intervene is the realm of domestic relations."'I
It added that "in general it is appropriate for the federal courts to leave
delicate issues of domestic relations to the state courts." ' 1 2 Much of the
Court's opinion stresses the need for judicial caution in the domain of
family law.
This claim connects nicely with the suggestion that the Lawrence
decision was rooted in an American-style version of desuetude. When a
law has lost support in public convictions, judicial invalidation is least
damaging to democratic goals and to the Court's own institutional
position. At least at this stage, the ban on same-sex marriage stands on
much firmer footing. I emphasize my belief that, in principle, such a
ban raises serious equal protection concerns and is not simple to defend
in constitutionally acceptable terms; the objection to an aggressive
ruling from federal courts has everything to do with their properly
limited role in the constitutional structure.

V.

AGAINST MARRIAGE? THE SURPRISINGLY PLAUSIBLE CASE FOR
DEREGULATION

An issue here still lurks in the background, one that raises even
larger questions than those I have discussed thus far. Marriage is an
official licensing scheme. Should it continue? Would deregulation be
appropriate, here as elsewhere?
A.

Problems

Many people argue that thb law ought to move in this direction." 13
For one thing, the institution of marriage has a discriminatory past,
enmeshed as it has been in sex inequality, and this past cannot easily be
severed from the current version of the institution. 1 4 For another, the
110 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). I am grateful to Mary
Anne Case for pointing out the relevance of Newdow to the marriage issue.
I ld. at 2309.
112 Id.

113 See FINEMAN, supra note 2.
114 See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
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marital institution was originally a means of licensing both sexual
activities and child-rearing; and it no longer has that role. For many
generations, official marriage served to authorize people both to have
sexual relationships and to have and to raise children. But currently this
is not so; indeed, people have a constitutional right to have sexual
relationships outside of marriage, and people become parents, including
adoptive parents, without the benefit of the marital form. In an era in
which marriage is not a necessary condition for sex or for children,
perhaps the state's role is no longer essential.
Still others emphasize that marriage has been a means for
protecting dependents, above all children and women; but they contend
that marriage is a crude tool for providing that protection, which could
be ensured in better, more direct ways. 1 5 Note in particular that a
primary reason for the official institution of marriage has been less to
limit entry (though that is certainly one of its purposes) than to police
exit. If divorce is difficult, as a result of legal restrictions or social
norms, then marriages are more likely to be stable. Marital stability is
often desirable for children. It can also be desirable for spouses, who
may benefit from social understandings that work against impulsive or
destructive decisions that are detrimental to their long-term welfare.
But if exit is not policed, through law or accompanying social norms, it
is at least harder to contend that the official institution of marriage is
valuable as a way of promoting the stability of relationships. And in the
modem era, exit is much less rigorously policed. As a matter of law, at
least, people can generally leave the marital form whenever they wish to
do so. Increasingly, marriage resembles a contract, dissoluble at the
will of the parties, rather than a permanent status.
It is also possible to object to the freedom-limiting functions of the
state's licensing system. Marriage licenses divide the world into the
status of those who are "married" and those who are "single," in a way
that produces serious economic and material disadvantages for the latter
(and sometimes for the former). Many of these economic and material
inequalities are not simple to defend. In any case, one or the other
status has a number of signalingfunctions, some of them incompatible
with the desires of those involved. Private relationships, intimate and
otherwise, might be structured in many different ways, and the simple
dichotomy between "single" and "married" does not do justice to what
people might choose. Indeed, that simple dichotomy is an imprecise
description of what people actually do choose, and perhaps increasingly
1 6
Many people are in relationships that are intimate, committed,
so."
Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L.
REv. 1535 (1993).
115 See id.
116 See id.; Emens, supra note 3, at 298 ("[A]dultery occurs often enough to undermine even
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and monogamous, but without the benefit of marriage. Many people are
in marriages that are neither intimate nor monogamous. Countless
variations are possible. Why not leave people's relationships to their
own choices, perhaps subject to the judgments of relevant intermediate
organizations, religious and otherwise?
To the extent that those choices leave gaps or uncertainties, the law
could choose a menu of default rules, perhaps intended to mimic what
most people would do, perhaps intended to force the parties to make
their wishes clear, perhaps intended to protect those most in need of
protection. An obvious concern is the well-being of children. But
private arrangements, religious and otherwise, might provide as much
protection of children as official marriage does; and the protection of
children might be ensured directly, through requirements of care and
support, rather than through marriage in its current form. It is also
possible to insist that couples benefit from public statements of
commitments-that the official institution of marriage helps to secure
people's commitments to one another, in a way that is both an
individual and social good. Probably this is so. But why is government
licensing necessary? Might not private institutions be able to provide
the same kinds of commitments?
B.

Thought Experiments and Parallel Worlds

The answer is hardly clear. But beware of a simple negative
answer, for the very familiarity of the institution of marriage might have
a distorting influence. To clarify the problem, imagine a parallel world
in which many people have official "best friends." In this parallel
world, the status of best friend is officially licensed. Most of the time,
there is a happy ceremony, and the relationship is accompanied by
identifiable responsibilities and rights, some of them acknowledged and
imposed by law. A best friend might, for example, have some of the
economic rights that spouses enjoy-for example, to help make
decisions in the event of incapacitation. In addition, it might be
understood by all that best friends, having achieved that (legal) status,
have strong informal duties to one another-to give comfort amidst
distress, to celebrate good developments, and to put personal concerns
to one side, when necessary, to attend to the relationship. We could
even imagine a sincere suggestion, in our own world, that formalization
of the status of "best friend" would help with an array of public and
private problems. Perhaps it is not the worst imaginable idea.

the idea of simple, serial monogamy-the idea that people have one sexual partner at a time.").
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But we could also imagine a state in this parallel world, after
having lived with the "best friend" status for generations, now deciding
that it should eliminate the institution, on the ground that the formalized
idea of "best friend" creates excessive rigidity, and that in general,
people should be able to make private arrangements as they see fit.
If their
Radical reformers might make exactly this suggestion.
arguments were heeded, people in this society, after the reforms, would
certainly be permitted to announce to one another that they are "best
friends" or even to have private "best friend" ceremonies. Or they
could dispense with the idea if they chose. In this parallel world, the
abolition of the status of "best friend" would count as a genuine
revolution. But would it clearly be a mistake to abolish official best
friend licenses? Those who object to the official institution of marriage
think that people would be better off, all things considered, in a system
in which state licensing did not occur.
Of course the analogy is imprecise. Very plausibly, the argument
for best friend licenses is much weaker than the argument for marriage
licenses. Consider, then, another parallel world, in which the relevant
government has never recognized marriages, but in which it is possible
to find a multiplicity of private arrangements. In this parallel world,
many people are married within their religious traditions. Many others
are married through secular institutions of one or another kind. Many
couples do not marry at all. Monogamy is sometimes chosen;
sometimes it is rejected. In this parallel world, a reformer proposes that
states should grant licenses to couples willing to apply and who meet
the relevant requirements. Perhaps the proposal should and will be
accepted. But we could easily imagine a vigorous debate. The skeptics
would contend that the state ought not to decide who can marry
whom-that this is a decision for individuals and for private
organizations. In any case, an appreciation of the grounds for their
skepticism suggests that the case for an official, publicly administered
institution of marriage is not entirely clear.
C.

Solemnity, Conservatism,and Official Licensing

I am not contending that state licensing of marriage should be
abolished. 1 7 For countless generations, people have relied on the
existence of a state licensing scheme, and it is hardly clear that the
The official ceremony,
scheme does more harm than good.
degree of solemnity that
a
to
contributes
licenses,
state
by
accompanied
and that almost
involved,
those
to
is widely perceived as beneficial
117 See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 191-209 for detailed discussion.
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certainly contributes to the stability of relationships, in a way that
benefits adults and children alike. Even with the official institution in
place, people can organize their relationships in multiple different ways,
through (for example) religious marriages that do not involve the state
and informal understandings of monogamy or continuity that do not
involve official marriage. Hence it is not at all clear that the institution
of marriage does much damage.
There is an institutional point as well. For social reform, as for
courts, the presumption should be in favor of incremental change; and
abolition of state-licensed marriage would be anything but incremental.
But it is important to understand the argument against official marriage,
if only to show that the topic here is a form of government intervention,
and that there is a sharp distinction between religious marriages, and
marriages of other sorts, and marriages as recognized and legitimated by
official licensors. What I have been discussing here is the latter, not the
former.

CONCLUSION

My goal has been to make progress on two questions. The first is
the content of the right to marry. The second is the scope of that right.
I have suggested that like the right to vote, the right to marry is a
right of equal access to a publicly-administered institution. If a state
abolished the official institution of marriage, it would be acting
constitutionally, so long as it did not also abolish private marriage
ceremonies. The state is under no obligation to confer either the
expressive or the material benefits of marriage.
Some of the
associational benefits now connected with marriage could, and probably
must, be respected even if marriage did not exist. But this is not a claim
that marriage itself must be recognized by state law. These points help
to show that the right to marry is parasitic on positive law. It is a right
of access, by those who enjoy it, to the expressive and material benefits
that official marriage provides.
This point strongly suggests that the right to marry ought not to be
protected as a matter of substantive due process. It is far more sensibly
seen as part of the "fundamental rights" branch of equal protection
doctrine. Unfortunately, there is no simple explanation of why it should
so qualify. The most plausible account points to the expressive benefits
of marriage. It suggests that in view of the great importance of those
benefits, and their relationship to other constitutionally protected
interests, states must provide extremely strong justifications for
interfering with the right to marry.
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I have also identified competing understandings of the scope of the
right to marry. The minimal understanding views the right to require
access, by any couple consisting of one adult man and one adult
woman, to the expressive and material benefits of marriage, so long as
the institution of marriage exists. This minimal understanding has the
advantage of fitting with the Court's decisions; it also has a degree of
simplicity, promises a deferential role for courts, and can claim to build
The minimal
on, rather than to reject, longstanding traditions.
understanding does create problems for some bans on incestuous
marriages; but where those bans cannot be plausibly defended by
reference to actual harm, judicial invalidations are hardly deplorable.
The chief advantage of the minimal understanding is that it
promises to minimize judicial discretion and to rely on practices that,
simply because they are time-honored, have a claim to social respect.
The chief disadvantage of the minimal understanding is that it has a
degree of arbitrariness. The best way to handle that arbitrariness, I
suggest, is not through the Due Process Clause, which grows out of
traditional practices, but through the antidiscrimination principles of the
Equal Protection Clause, which is sharply critical of them. There can be
no doubt that the Due Process Clause, in its substantive guise, has come
to have an equality component, one that tests the question whether the
18
But for
lines drawn by tradition can claim adequate support.
involves
marry
to
right
constitutional purposes, any judgment about the
an assessment of the legitimacy of those lines. There are significant
advantages in acknowledging that the Equal Protection Clause, a selfconscious attack on traditional practices, is the relevant text for making
that assessment. I have suggested that in principle, there are serious
constitutional problems with the ban on same-sex marriage. But I have
also suggested that federal courts should greatly hesitate in this domain,
allowing a great deal of room for democratic judgment and for state
experimentation.
What about the marital institution itself? There are surprisingly
plausible arguments for privatization-for eliminating the government's
role and for allowing private institutions, religious and otherwise, to do
as they wish, subject to default rules and criminal prohibitions. Some of
the longstanding arguments for official marriage have been weakened,
now that exit is freely available, and now that private alternatives are
legally permissible. In addition, the official institution does some harm,
insofar as it makes certain distinctions that are not so easy to justify (as,
for example, in the tax code), and insofar as it separates, too rigidly,
relationships into the simple dichotomy of "married" and "unmarried."
For a defense of this view, see
118 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1177,
1186-92 (1980).
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I have not argued that the official institution of marriage should be
abolished; like most people, I believe that it should be continued. But
an understanding of the arguments against it clarifies the fact that
marriage is unambiguously a form of government intervention, one
whose future form should be a matter not of following dictates of any
kind, but of our own free choices.
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